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The culminating point of administration is to know well how much power, great or small, we ought to use
in all circumstances.
(Charles de Montesquieu 1689–1755).
1 Introduction
The separation of powers is a multifaceted concept: There is separation of powers
between the legislative, the judicative, and the executive branches, including the
administration, between central government and local governments, between
domestic and international bodies, between the population and politicians, and so
forth. While all the different types of separation of powers are usually inscribed into
the constitution and laws, they are endogenous to the struggle between the different
actors in the politico-economic process, most importantly between the constituents
and their parliamentary representatives.
Although it is plausible that the self-interest of politicians plays a crucial role in
determining the extent and scope of the separation of powers, surprisingly little is
known about what really drives their behavior with respect to the separation of
powers. The problem of empirical analyses in this domain lies in separating self-
interest of politicians from their constituents’ preferences which they are supposed
to represent. In particular, explicit decisions regarding the separation of powers do
not occur frequently, and we know of no empirical study that simultaneously
analyzes how representatives act and what constituents want with respect to this
issue.
We look at a specific aspect of the separation of powers, the separation of the
executive from the legislative branch by analyzing incompatibility rules that restrict
public servants from joining the parliament. While this topic seems to have been
less of a concern in the United States, it is essential in the French tradition of the
separation of powers as developed by Charles de Montesquieu or Benjamin
Constant.1 This type of separation of powers was institutionalized, for instance, in
various former French constitutions or in Switzerland where it is forbidden for
individual members of the executive and its arm, i.e. the federal administration, to
serve as members of the national legislative. From a politico-economic perspective,
however, it is to be expected that members of the administration are interested in
weakening this specific aspect of separation of powers. While in most countries it
would be almost impossible to test such a hypothesis, Switzerland exhibits an
informative institutional setting which allows for testing it.
We pursue a straightforward empirical approach to disentangle the behavior of
parliamentary representatives from the preference of the constituents regarding the
separation of powers between the legislature and the administration. As argued
already by Schneider et al. (1981) and discussed more recently by Portmann et al.
(2012, 2013), among others, constituents in Switzerland reveal their preferences for
1 A potential reason for this aspect of the separation of powers to differ between countries might be that
in small countries (such as Switzerland) and in countries with a large capital (such as France with Paris),
it is technically possible for a relevant number of representatives to work at the same time as national
public servants, to be a resident of an election district and to act as a national representative in the capital.
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policy proposals in referenda. The proposals are implemented immediately if the
majority of voters approves them, i.e. they entail real policy consequences.2
Importantly, Swiss parliamentary representatives vote on exactly the same
legislative proposals as constituents vote on in referenda.
Although, we can observe what constituents want and what their representatives
do, explicit proposals to change the separation of powers arise only seldom in stable
democracies. A referendum in the year 1922, however, represents a particularly
interesting instance. The referendum gave constituents the choice to make public
servants at the federal level eligible for the national parliament. Representatives also
expressed their opinion on this issue in a parliamentary roll call vote. Thus,
constituents and representatives both voted on the very same proposal to soften the
separation of powers between the legislature and the administration.3
This unique referendum allows us to gain insights into the behavior of politicians
with respect to the preferences of the population in the instance of a reform of the
separation of powers. We compiled voting records for individual members of
parliament in 1922 who had voted on the amendment of making federal public
servants eligible. Moreover, we gathered data on personal characteristics of
representatives for the same year, including their party affiliation and a number of
district characteristics. Most importantly, we have information on whether members
of parliament had a profession in the public service at the local or cantonal (Swiss
state) level prior to entering national parliament.4 Thus, our setting permits to
identify the effect of ties to the public service on political decisions regarding the
separation of powers between legislature and administration, while controlling for
constituents’ preferences on this issue. Controlling for constituents’ preferences is
essential as representatives are expected to represent them independently of their
profession.
Empirical results indicate that legislators with a profession in the public service
have a higher probability of voting yes for the eligibility of federal public servants
for national parliament, i.e. they tend to favor a reduction in the separation of
powers between the legislature and the administration. This holds true when
controlling for the preferences of constituents that members of parliament are
supposed to represent. While constituents’ preferences usually exert a significant
influence on the probability of a representative voting yes in parliament, ties to the
public service exert an independent and important influence on the representative’s
propensity to relax the separation of powers. Thus, our results show that individual
interests and personal motivations of representatives, while not annihilating the
influence of constituents’ preferences, matter to a large extent in parliamentary
decisions with respect to the separation of powers.
Our results hold true for an array of additional control variables such as age of a
representative in 1922, time in office, education and party affiliation, as well as
2 Referenda as a measurement for preferences of constituents for other issues are also used by Brunner
et al. (2013), Garrett (1999) or Hersch and McDougall (1988) in the United States.
3 The referendum was rejected and even today federal public servants in Switzerland cannot become
parliamentary representatives to the National Council.
4 Local and cantonal public servants were allowed to serve as representatives to national parliament but
federal public servants were not eligible.
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different district characteristics. Moreover, our data provide some evidence that
representatives from districts with a low number of seats, i.e. close to majority rule,
tend to have less leeway in deviating from constituents’ preferences than
representatives from large districts, i.e. proportional representation.
This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
literature. Section 3 describes the data setting and identification strategy. Section 4
presents the empirical results and refinements, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
There is a vast literature in economics and political science on the separation of
powers and numerous aspects of checks-and-balances have been explored. While
scholars often explore the horizontal separation of powers, vertical separation of
powers as well as other aspects are likely to be a necessary complement to the
classical separation of powers. An example for an analysis of different aspects of the
separation of powers is Laffont and Martimort (1998) who analyze how government
organization may constrain interest groups from trying to capture political decision
makers. They show that centralization is costly because it facilitates coordination
among interest groups. Laffont and Meleu (2001) provide a model where the
separation of powers is used as a potential instrument against corruption of political
agents. Congleton (2013) discusses bargaining in the context of the separation of
powers and highlights that a central aspect is not whether governance is divided but
how constitutional bargaining reassigns authority. He argues that previous work can
be separated into two levels of analysis, those concerned with government officials
and those dealing with government officials and voters.
Our analysis highlights interactions between public servants and parliamentary
decisions regarding the separation of powers. Le Maux (2009) offers a synthesis of
the theoretical literature and analyzes the impact of bureaucratic behavior on tax
rates by comparing different models of public choice. Warren (2012) studies public
sector agencies and shows that the executive’s agents, i.e. bureaucrats, may help to
shift policy strongly toward the executive. Ting (2012) presents a model in which
legislators bargain over the allocation of distributive benefits and may bypass
bureaucratic scrutiny. Nicholson-Crotty and Miller (2012) focus on bureaucratic
influence over legislative outcomes in the United States and suggest that legislators
perceive the bureaucracy’s influence to be stronger in states with term limits, united
governments, and fragmented executive branches. A more comprehensive survey of
the literature on public bureaucracy is provided by Moe (2012). While the literature
on interactions between bureaucracy and government, legislature and even lobbies
is highly refined, the influence of public servants on parliaments and parliamentary
outcomes through active participation of public servants as parliamentary members
seems to have received little attention. Some early contributions by Klatt (1976,
1980) and Schrode (1977) and more recently Bra¨ndle and Stutzer (2010, 2013)
focus on the eligibility of public servants to parliament. In particular, Bra¨ndle and
Stutzer (2010) highlight potential conflicts of interest when public servants become
representatives. They analyze data from the German La¨nder and show that
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compensation for public servants for having to hold their office while in parliament
increased the fraction of members of parliament who are public servants. Similarly,
legal incompatibility of a position in the public service decreases the fraction of
public servants. In Bra¨ndle and Stutzer (2013), a framework is proposed to integrate
the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis of parliamentary oversight
with a particular emphasis on public servants.
As politicians are expected to represent voter preferences, the identification
of the latter constitutes a central pillar for a direct test of how politicians act when
the separation of powers is at stake. There is a large literature trying to measure
whether representatives do what the constituents want. A main challenge in the
literature is to find a measure for voter preferences. Scholars often rely on
parliamentary roll call votes (e.g., rendered interpretable by using ADA or
NOMINATE scores), on demographic variables and presidential election results as
potential proxies for voter preferences (Ardoin and Garand 2003). Matsusaka (2010)
notes that comparisons between politicians’ and voters’ positions may be
misleading and are frequently misinterpreted when politicians and voters are not
measured on readily comparable scales. Our contribution overcomes measurement
issues by using revealed constituents’ preferences for a referendum on the
separation of powers for which a directly comparable parliamentary decision exists.
Only very few studies have performed a referendum-by-referendum comparison
between voters and representatives in the past (Hersch and McDougall 1988 or
Garrett 1999). However, the match between referendum decisions and legislators’
roll call votes has been revived by Stadelmann et al. (2012, 2013) and Portmann
et al. (2012, 2013) who all rely on comparing the voting behavior of representatives
to the Swiss parliament with the voting behavior of citizens in referenda on exactly
the same issue.5 Recently, Brunner et al. (2013) employed a broad set of referenda
in California to investigate effects of income on representation and Potrafke (2013)
analyzes parliamentary votes and referenda on concert halls in Germany cities.
None of these contributions, however, focuses on the separation of powers.
Moreover, the approach has not been used to control for citizen’s preferences when
analyzing the behavior of politicians and public servants when the separation of
powers between legislature and administration is at stake.
3 Data, measurement and estimation strategy
3.1 Initiative on the separation of powers
Switzerland’s federal constitution, which dates back to 1848, established a
bicameral parliament. Switzerland has a long tradition of direct democracy at the
federal level, such that proposals accepted by parliament do not necessarily turn
directly into law and constitutional amendments. A referendum is mandatory for
any amendment to the constitution and citizens may demand a popular referendum
5 Carey and Hix (2013) and Eichenberger et al. (2012) draw on the same dataset but focus district
magnitude and public debts respectively.
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on parliamentary decisions when laws are concerned. Importantly for our case,
citizens may also propose constitutional amendments by demanding an initiative
(for details see Portmann et al. 2013). Referendum decisions reflect revealed
preferences for policies, as they permit constituents to rank referenda against the
status quo (see e.g. Schneider et al. 1981; Frey 1994; Brunner et al. 2013). Hug
(2009) discusses how institutions of representative democracy interact with
referenda.
In our analysis, we focus on an initiative by the Federal Association of Public
Servants, Employees, and Laborers (‘‘Fo¨derativverband eidgeno¨ssischer Beamter,
Angestellter und Arbeiter’’) in 1922 which aimed at relaxing the separation of
powers between the legislature and the federal administration. The Federal
Association of Public Servants, Employees, and Laborers was established in
1903. It cooperated with the Swiss Association of Public Service Employees, which
represented its members mainly at the local and cantonal level and was later
integrated into the Federal Association of Public Servants, Employees, and
Laborers. In 1920 it had approximately 55,000 members.
The aim of the initiative was to replace article 77 in the constitution of May 29,
1874. This article stipulates the separation of powers between the National Council
(the first chamber of the parliament) and the executive power (i.e. the administration
and its heads) as well as the Council of States (second chamber of parliament).
While the article is silent on the separation of powers between the executive power
and the Council of States,6 it stipulates that members of the Council of States, the
Federal Council (the heads of the executive power who are elected by the
parliament) and public servants employed at the federal level (federal administra-
tion) were not eligible as members of the National Council. Thus, up until 1922, the
constitutional separation of powers between the federal legislature and the federal
administration with respect to the eligibility of federal public servants had been
upheld, i.e. no federal public servants were eligible to the National Council. In fact,
this constitutional separation of powers still holds today albeit in a slightly
weakened version. Employees of the federal administration can now run for the
National Council, but if elected they can only assume their duty as representatives if
they quit their profession in the administration (Federal Law on the Parliament,
Parlamentsgesetz, Art. 14c).
The proposed change in 1922 to the constitution restated that members of the
Council of States and the Federal Council could not be members of the National
Council at the same time. It also explicitly stated that high-level public
servants who are directly subject to the Federal Council must not be members of
the National Council. However, the initiative made other public servants at the
federal level as well as public servants of the federal railway eligible to the National
Council by not explicitly excluding their eligibility. While it seems modest in its
aim at a quick glance, the initiative represents a profound reduction in the separation
of powers between the legislative branch and the federal administration and was
discussed as such. Actually, the weakening of the separation of powers had been a
main argument in the official message (‘‘Botschaft’’) of the Federal Council to the
6 The election procedures for the Council of States is subject to the sovereignty of the cantons.
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parliament (Schweizer Bundesrat 1920) as well as in the respective debate
(Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung 1922) and in public media outlets
(e.g., Eichenberger, Der Gemeinde-und Staatsarbeiter 1922). It was prominently
argued that the separation of powers would become diluted if public employees who
directly or indirectly are appointed by the Federal Council could become members
of the National Council. The discussion also considered the danger that public
servants in parliament might hold up the view of the body by whom they were
employed (in particular with the Federal Council as the head of the executive
branch) instead of the interest of the general public (e.g. Amtliches Bulletin der
Bundesversammlung 1922).
In Switzerland as a whole, the initiative was rejected with 38.4 % of voters
supporting it. However, there was important variation between different constitu-
encies. Figure 1 and the accompanying table present the results for all 25
constituencies.7 Several constituencies voted with a clear majority that federal
public servants should be eligible to the National Council. For example, almost 2/3
of voters in Basel-Stadt and Ticino supported the initiative, while fewer than 20 %
of citizens in Fribourg, Obwalden, Niwalden and Appenzell Innerrhoden accepted
the proposed change in eligibility rules. In other constituencies, the acceptance or
rejection margin was fairly narrow, introducing an interesting variation that we
exploit in our empirical analysis.
3.2 Measuring constituents’ preferences and representatives’ behavior
A distinctive feature of our data is that we can match the support of the initiative in
each constituency with the parliamentary final roll call vote of the politicians
representing the respective constituency. In fact, the proposal of the initiative is
identical to the text on which members of parliament decided in their roll call votes.
Thus, we obtain a direct measure of representation of a constituency’s preferences
by its respective members of parliament. Either a member of parliament matches
the majority decision of his8 constituents or he does not. As politicians have to
decide in parliament before constituents vote on initiatives, they have to predict
what their constituents’ preferences are. Thus, they need to act in the same manner
as they do for any other policy decision in parliament when trying to represent
constituents’ preferences (see Garrett 1999 for a similar argument). This fact
provides a certain level of external validity of our setting: Politicians cannot simply
follow the revealed behavior of their constituents. When making their decision in
parliament they can only use standard ways (experience, surveys, contact with
constituents, etc.) to obtain information about the preferences of the constituency, as
in countries without initiatives (see Brunner et al. 2013 for a more thorough
7 In 1922 the Canton of Jura did not exist but the respective area was part of the Canton of Berne.
8 There were no women in parliament in 1922, and we thus use the masculine form when denoting a
single representative.
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discussion).9 Of course, representatives do not simply try to mirror the qualitative
preferences of their constituents but weight them against their own preferences.
Moreover, representatives are elected by their constituents to represent them. These
facts make the actual voting behavior of the citizens the relevant control variable
when analyzing the behavior of representatives. Finally, if there is probabilistic
voting (Hinich 1977) and the intensity of preferences systematically drives voting
behavior such that the share of votes also reflects preference intensity, we may
expect a high correlation between the share of yes votes and the intensity of
preferences.
We were able to compile voting record information of all 188 members of the Swiss
National Council for the decision on the eligibility of federal public servants during the
25th legislature. 41 members of parliament did not vote on the issue or were absent
during the parliamentary decision on April 07, 1922. For each representative in our
dataset, we gathered biographical information. In particular, we know the prior
professions of members of parliament and can thus identify whether they have ties with
Canton
Share of 
acceptance Canton
Share of 
acceptance
Aargau (AG) 0.346 Obwalden (OW) 0.155
Appenzell A. Rh. (AI) 0.338 Schaffhausen (SH) 0.436
Appenzell I. Rh. (AR) 0.108 Schwyz (SZ) 0.377
Basel-Landschaft (BL) 0.536 Solothurn (SO) 0.597
Basel-Stadt (BS) 0.655 St. Gallen (SG) 0.336
Bern/Berne (including Jura) (BE) 0.402 Thurgau (TG) 0.265
Fribourg/Freiburg (FR) 0.169 Ticino (TI) 0.650
Genève (GE) 0.522 Uri (UR) 0.474
Glarus (GL) 0.560 Valais/Wallis (VS) 0.214
Graubünden/Grigioni (GR) 0.338 Vaud (VD) 0.285
Luzern (LU) 0.280 Zug (ZG) 0.440
Neuchâtel (NE) 0.463 Zürich (ZH) 0.407
Nidwalden (NW) 0.146
Notes: In 1922 the Canton of Jura did not exist but the respective area was part of the Canton of Berne. 
Source: Federal Statistical Office
Fig. 1 Voting on the eligibility of federal public servants. Notes: In 1922 the Canton of Jura did not exist
but the respective area was part of the Canton of Berne. Source: Federal Statistical Office
9 While voters rely on parliament as a whole for advice in complex and attention demanding situations
(Stadelmann and Torgler 2013), individual representatives cannot reasonably be assumed to shift the
majority’s of the whole constituency.
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the public service or not. We classify representatives with the professions ‘‘local public
servant’’ (e.g. communal secretary), ‘‘teacher’’, ‘‘district judge’’ and ‘‘trade union
representative’’ as having a profession in the public service.10 Note that all
representatives who are classified as public servants do their service at the communal
or cantonal level. They are not public servants at the federal level as federal public
servants are not eligible for parliament. For two members of parliament, we were unable
to obtain historical information on their profession and their life in general. Thus, we end
up with a sample of 145 representatives. 45.5 % of all representatives voted in favor of
the change in the eligibility of federal public servants, and 40.0 % of all representatives
had ties to the public service, according to our main identification based on their
professions. Moreover, we know the age of each representative in 1922, the time he had
spent in office as a member of parliament as of the date of the vote, whether he achieved
a university degree (or equivalent at the time) and whether he is affiliated with a left-
wing party.
For the 25th legislature from 1919 to 1922, representatives were elected in 25
constituencies. We compiled a number of variables characterizing these constituencies.
In particular, we use firm density per 100 inhabitants to proxy industrial development in
each constituency in 1922,11 subsidies for education per capita, which measures the
potential dependence on the federal administration, and the share of Catholics to
measure conservatism.12
Table 5 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics on all variables for
members of parliament and their constituencies. Due to the data structure, all
variables and in particular constituents’ preferences for the change in eligibility
rules are actually observed (i.e. no values are imputed) and available from the
sources given in the description of Table 5.
3.3 Estimation strategy
Given the institutional setting and the data, our empirical approach is simple and
straightforward. We want to know whether local and cantonal public servants have a
higher propensity to vote yes in the referendum on the eligibility of federal public
servants for the Swiss Parliament, independent of their constituents’ preferences.
We estimate the equation
MPYesic ¼ a þ b1 Profession in public serviceð Þiþb2 Constituents yes shareð Þc
þ Xicc þ eic ð1Þ
where MPYesic indicates whether a member of parliament i representing constitu-
ency c voted yes or no in parliament, Profession in public service is an identifier for
10 We also extend the definition of ties to the public service in refinements by analyzing the profession of
the representatives’ parents and their general life history. Our results remain stable when excluding ‘‘trade
union representative’’ from this definition.
11 As the concept of national accounts was only established long after 1922, firm density may also be
regarded as a proxy for GDP.
12 Note that we also separate the sample into French/Italian and German speaking constituencies, which
does not change our main results.
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whether a member of parliament is a local or cantonal public servant and Con-
stituents yes share gives the preferences of a member of parliament’s constituency.
Xic stands for other control variables, and eic denotes an error term.
13
The coefficient b1 is supposed to capture the influence of having ties to the public
service on the probability of voting yes regarding the eligibility of federal public
servants for parliament. We would expect that ties to the public service generally
increase the probability to vote yes, i.e. b1 [ 0.
As all politicians who serve as public servants at the local or cantonal level
were elected to parliament by their constituents, it is reasonable to assume that the
variable Profession in public service may not only reflect a representative’s
profession but also his constituents’ preferences. Thus, conditioning on observed
preferences of a constituency is necessary to identify how politicians with ties to
the public service vote in parliament regarding the issue of the separation of
powers. We include the variable Constituents yes share and its influence is
captured by b2. Failure to include preferences of a constituency might yield an
estimate of b1 in Eq. (1) that does not only include the impact of ties to the public
service but also the impact of a constituency’s preferences represented by the
politician. Conditioning on preferences of constituencies, which is only possible if
preferences are known as in our case, solves this inherent omitted variable bias
and the related selection issue. The coefficient b1 is thus supposed to capture the
effect of preexisting ties to the public service independently of specific preferences
of constituents for the separation of powers for the parliamentary decision
analyzed.
While the literature generally recognizes the need to control for a constitu-
ency’s preferences when voting decisions in parliament are analyzed, we know of
no other study that uses such a direct measure for revealed preferences regarding
decisions on the separation of powers between the legislature and the adminis-
tration. Moreover, according to the previous literature, we may speculate that
other controls such as personal characteristics, party affiliation and constituency-
specific variables may be associated with legislative voting (Washington 2008).
We include an array of such variables that are available in the year 1922 in our
specifications.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Baseline results
Table 1 presents our baseline results for the influence of ties with the public service
on the support for the legislative proposal regarding the eligibility of federal public
servants for parliament. For each of the specifications, we reported robust standard
errors clustered by constituencies.14
13 In a number of alternative specifications, we also estimate logistic versions of Eq. (1).
14 Without clustering standard errors would be lower.
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In specification (1), the dependent variable is explained by the identifier for
whether a representative has a profession as a local or cantonal public servant and
preferences of constituents. We estimate Eq. (1) without additional controls and use
the total number (145) of available individual observations. Results indicate that
representatives with a profession in the public service tend to support parliamentary
eligibility of federal public servants holding constituents’ preferences constant. The
coefficient for the variable Profession in public service is positive and significant at
the 5 %-level, and the coefficient for the variable Constituent yes share is, as
expected, also positive and significant. While representatives react to their
constituency’s preferences, public servants are approximately 15.1 % points more
likely to vote yes than other members of parliament are.15 Thus, the characteristic of
having a profession in public service increases the probability of voting yes
compared to politicians who are not public servants independently of the will of
constituents, i.e. representatives with ties to the public service tend to vote for a
reduction of the separation of powers between the legislature and the administration.
The effect found is quantitatively large and important. The fact that a parliamen-
tarian has ties to the administration affects his probability of voting yes to the same
extent as if the yes vote share of the constituents increased by about 14.8 % points
(1.0207 9 0.148 = 0.151).
In specification (2), we include a number of other characteristics of parliamentary
representatives. In particular, we control for age, time in office, and whether a
representative has a university degree or not. While it is plausible that these aspects
might have various linear as well as non-linear and partly countervailing effects on
the voting behavior of representatives, their net effects are not clear. Nevertheless, it
is important to control for these aspects to gain confidence that it is in fact the
profession of the representative which is driving the results. All additional
characteristics do not have any significant effects on the probability of voting yes on
changes in eligibility rules. More importantly, we still find that Profession in public
service exerts a positive and significant effect on supporting the eligibility for
federal public servants, and constituents’ preferences have a positive effect on
voting yes.
We include an identifier for whether a politician is affiliated with a left party
in specification (3). Public servants and the citizens who voted for them may be
more likely to affiliate with left parties, such that controlling for this variable is
of importance. Constituents elect their representatives, who are then expected to
represent them. Thus, preferences reflected by the yes share among constituents
are likely to be correlated to preferences for left- or right-wing representatives
such that a certain part of revealed preferences and the identifier for having a
profession in the public service may be captured by the variable Left-wing
politician. Put differently, controlling for left-wing party affiliation provides a
conservative test for our hypothesis that politicians with ties to the public service
tend to vote for a reduction in the separation of powers. We find that politicians
holding a profession in the public service still accept the change in eligibility
15 If we did not control for constituents’ preferences in the estimation, the effect found would be even
larger, by approximately 5 % points.
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rules with a higher probability. The coefficient for Profession in public service is
positive, significant and similar in size compared to earlier specifications. Being a
left-wing politician also increases the probability of voting yes. As expected,
however, when controlling for Left-wing politician, the coefficient for observed
preferences of constituents decreases in size and becomes insignificant.16
Table 1 Baseline results—representatives with profession in public service support eligibility of federal
public servants independently of constituents’ preferences
OLS Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profession in public service 0.151*
(0.083)
0.148**(0.075) 0.155***
(0.058)
0.153***
(0.054)
0.641*
(0.349)
1.035***
(0.329)
Constituent yes share 1.021***
(0.355)
0.850**
(0.431)
0.394
(0.309)
0.374
(0.351)
4.465**
(1.751)
2.294
(2.566)
Age -0.031
(0.034)
-6.7e-03
(0.027)
4.3e-03
(0.218)
Age squared 1.7e-04
(3.2e-04)
9.9e-06
(2.4e-04)
-4.1e-04
(2.0e-03)
Time in office 0.012
(0.014)
0.017
(0.013)
0.114
(0.101)
Time in office squared -5.0e-04
(4.1e-04)
-6.4e-04
(4.0e-04)
-4.2e-03
(3.3e-03)
University degree -0.024
(0.059)
0.027
(0.050)
0.211
(0.365)
Left-wing politician 0.686***
(0.056)
0.652***
(0.070)
11.029***
(0.376)
Intercept 0.519***
(0.057)
1.614*
(0.878)
0.276***
(0.057)
0.527
(0.767)
0.094
(0.253)
-0.687
(5.746)
R2 0.090 0.174 0.416 0.434 0.119 0.573
Log-Likelihood 13.462 81.079
Brier score 0.226 0.138
No. obs. 145 145 145 145 145 145
DE of Profession
in public service
– – – – 0.159*
(0.085)
0.222***
(0.080)
DE of Constituent
yes share
– – – – 0.125***
(0.045)
0.045
(0.043)
The dependent variable for all estimations is MP votes Yes. Estimated robust clustered standard errors for
constituencies are reported throughout the table. DE stands for the discrete effect, i.e., the estimated change in
the probability than an MP votes Yes for change from zero to one for Profession in public service or from the
first quartile to the third quartile for Constituent yes share. ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of
below 1 %, between 1 and 5 %, and between 5 and 10 %, respectively
16 We expect that the insignificant result for the variable Constituent yes share reflects the fact that more
left-wing constituents tend to elect more left-wing candidates and at the same time these constituents also
support a reduction in the separation of powers in favor of federal public servants.
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In specification (4) we include all variables regarding personal characteristics and
party affiliations. The results are similar to specification (3). In particular, having
ties to the public service increases the probability of voting yes for the eligibility of
federal public servants.
In specifications (5) and (6) we run logit versions of specifications (1) and (4). As
our dependent variable is a dummy variable, logit regressions are superior to OLS,
but the interpretation of the coefficients is more difficult. We calculate discrete
effects for changes in the variables Profession in public service and Constituent yes
share to facilitate interpretation. Independent of the estimation technique, we
generally find similar results. The variable Profession in public service always has a
positive and significant effect on the probability of voting yes in parliament and
Constituent yes share has a positive effect in specification (5), which becomes
insignificant if party affiliation is controlled for in specification (6). The discrete
effects of the two variables are indicated at the bottom of the table. Having a
profession in the public service increases the probability of voting yes in
specification (5) by approximately 15.9 % points and in specification (6) by
20.9 % points, which are two large and relevant effects in comparison to the discrete
effect of the variable Constituent yes share.
Thus, all our specification up to this point suggest that members of parliament
who have a profession in the public service at the local or cantonal level tend to
support the eligibility of federal public servants to parliament. This effect holds true
even when controlling for the preferences of constituents that members of
parliament are supposed to represent as well as when controlling for individual
characteristics and party affiliation. Representatives with ties to the public service
seem to favor a reduction of the separation of powers, which strengthens public
servants in the legislature. These results fosters the view that public servants face
conflicts of interests in parliament (see Bra¨ndle and Stutzer 2010, 2013) that are
often neglected in public debates.
4.2 Robustness and refinements
Table 2 summarizes our investigation of whether our results are robust to additional
constituency characteristics such as firm density or conservatism and individual
characteristics of politicians.
We included Firm density defined as the number of firms per 100 inhabitants as a
measure for industrialization in 1922 among our two other variables Profession in
public service and Constituent yes share in specification (1). The coefficient for
Firm density itself is negative and marginally significant with a p value of 0.126.
Thus, politicians from constituencies with a higher firm density marginally tend to
oppose eligibility of federal public servants. Although, we would have preferred to
command on a more reliable measure to mirror economic development, the choice
is not critical, as we are mainly interested in whether the inclusion of this variable
leaves the coefficient for Profession in public service unaffected. Importantly, the
positive effect of our main variable of interest Profession in public service remains
robust, suggesting that representatives with a profession in the public service voted
yes more often.
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In specification (2) we analyze whether federal subsidies have an impact on the
behavior of politicians who are also public servants. It may be the case that
constituencies that receive more support from the Confederation tend to be rather in
favor of eligibility rules for the same bureaucrats who distribute that support and
because they suppose that the federal administration plays and important role. We
use federal subsidies for education per capita as an additional control that has a
positive but insignificant impact.17 The control for Firm density now becomes
significant. Again, the variable Profession in Public service remains positive,
significant and of similar magnitude compared to earlier specifications.
In specification (3) we include the share of Catholics as a proxy for conservatism.
This additional control has a negative effect but is insignificant and does not affect
any of the other results.
In specification (4) we include additional personal characteristics of politicians
(has university degree, age, and time in office) as well as the control for party
affiliation. We find similar results as before: Having ties with the public service
increases the probability of voting yes for the eligibility of federal public servants.
All other variables turn insignificant due to the control for party affiliation.18
We run logit regressions of specifications (3) and (4) in columns (5) and (6).
Again, our main results are robust, i.e. having a profession in the public service
significantly increases the probability of supporting the eligibility of federal public
servants. Constituents’ preferences have a positive and significant effect, while firm
density has a negative and significant effect in specification (5) but both variables
turn insignificant when controlling for party affiliation in specification (6).
Table 3 provides refinements and summarizes the tests for two differential
hypotheses. We start by using other measures to account for the proximity to public
servants’ interests. We draw on the historical encyclopedia of Switzerland
(‘‘Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz’’) and analyze the information available for
each individual representative. This allows us to identify the professions of parents
of representatives in 1922. We construct an identifier of whether at least one parent
has a profession as a public servant or not and denote it as Parents were public
servants.
Specifications (1) and (2) include this proxy of family relations with the public
service. While the identifier of whether a representative’s parents were public
servants turns out to be insignificant, our main identifier of having a profession in
the public service remains positive and significant. In specification (2) we rerun the
same regressions but with additional control variables for each representative as
well as control variables for constituencies. The results remain essentially the same
for our main variable of interest. Having a profession in the public service increases
the support for the eligibility of federal public servants.
17 Federal subsidies for education were fairly low in the 1920 s. Consequently, we also checked whether
total subsidies, which included also military support payments, had an influence. The results for total
subsidies is also insignificant.
18 Again, the insignificant results for all constituency specific controls when including the variable for
left-wing politicians is probably due to the fact that constituency characteristics and preferences also
determine who gets elected as a representative in the first place.
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Using the historical encyclopedia once more, we construct a life history-based
assessment of closeness to the public service. For example, a politician may have
been engaged in a trade union but was an attorney in his main profession. We would
then classify such a politician as ‘‘close to public service’’. We note that compared
to directly looking at professions, this is necessarily a subjective approach as life
histories of politicians are often complex and, thus, impossible to classify
objectively. Nevertheless, we believe that our identifier based on the life histories
offers an interesting additional proxy. Columns (3) and (4) use this alternative
measure, which has a positive and strongly significant impact on the probability of
voting yes for the eligibility of federal public servants. We also note that the
coefficients’ sizes increase compared to earlier specification.
Table 2 Robustness tests with cantonal control variables
OLS Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profession in public service 0.149*
(0.084)
0.142*
(0.083)
0.145*
(0.083)
0.151***
(0.054)
0.633*
(0.358)
1.039***
(0.312)
Constituent yes share 1.100***
(0.349)
0.847*
(0.435)
0.740**
(0.371)
0.296
(0.310)
3.346*
(1.744)
2.007
(2.255)
Firm density -0.058
(0.038)
-0.113**
(0.057)
-0.123**
(0.056)
-0.078
(0.052)
-0.559**
(0.266)
-0.575
(0.477)
Subsidies for education 0.067
(0.048)
0.071
(0.049)
0.034
(0.046)
0.317
(0.224)
0.222
(0.385)
Share of catholics -0.116
(0.176)
-0.025
(0.203)
-0.498
(0.837)
-0.097
(1.518)
Intercept 0.654***
(0.111)
0.591***
(0.109)
0.636***
(0.114)
0.512
(0.826)
0.624
(0.535)
-1.342
(5.988)
Control variables for
individual representatives
NO NO NO YES NO YES
R2 0.098 0.107 0.111 0.442 0.147 0.583
Log-Likelihood 16.870 82.979
Brier score 0.220 0.136
No. obs. 145 145 145 145 145 145
DE of Profession in
public service
– – – – 0.157*
(0.087)
0.228***
(0.074)
DE of Constituent yes share – – – – 0.096*
(0.049)
0.041
(0.045)
The dependent variable for all estimations is MP votes Yes. Estimated robust clustered standard errors for
constituencies are reported throughout the table. DE stands for the discrete effect, i.e., the estimated
change in the probability than an MP votes Yes for change from zero to one for Profession in public
service or from the first quartile to the third quartile for Constituent yes share. ‘‘Control variables for
individual representatives’’ include all individual specific control variables of Table 5. ***, **, and *
indicate a mean significance level of below 1 %, between 1 and 5 %, and between 5 and 10 %,
respectively
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In specifications (5) and (6) we interacted our original identifier for local public
servants with the number of seats in a constituency. We would expect that as the
number of seat increases, the possibility of deviating from constituents’ preferences
increases too, i.e. politicians from larger district have more leeway and are less
accountable to what constituents want. The pressure to represent the majority and to
be accountable is greater in small constituencies with only one or a low number of
representatives than in large districts (see Portmann et al. 2012). We observe a
positive and significant interaction term between Profession in public service and
Seats. The baseline effect (for hypothetical zero seats) is positive but insignificant.19
If the number of seats increases, the probability that representatives with ties to the
public service vote yes increases. Thus, Profession in public service exerts a larger
impact in constituencies with more seats where individual members of parliament
can be expected to have a greater leeway to diverge from constituents’ preferences.
The results of Portmann et al. (2012) regarding the influence of district
magnitude on the quality of representation and the possibility of diverging from
constituents’ preferences were extended by Carey and Hix (2013) and reanalyzed by
Portmann et al. (2013). Carey and Hix (2011, 2013) suggest that the leeway of
representatives does not increase linearly in district magnitude but that there is an
electoral ‘‘sweet spot’’ in small but not single-member districts within proportional
electoral systems where congruence between members of parliament with their
constituents’ may be expected to be highest. We employ an identifier of districts
with between two and four members of parliament and interact this identifier with
the variable Profession in public service. Profession in public service itself remains
positive and significant in specifications (7) and (8). The quantitative effect of the
point estimate of the interaction term is negative and would approximately offset the
baseline effect. However, as the interaction effect is not significant we might only
speculate that public servants from districts close to the electoral ‘‘sweet spot’’ tend
to behave similarly to members of parliament without ties to the public service.
We provide additional refinements with subsamples in Table 4 to analyze
whether legislators with ties to the public service respond similarly depending on
their characteristics and constituency specific variables.
In specifications (1) and (2) we exclude representatives who were classified as
professional politicians due to their background. We investigate the effect of our
main variable for ties to the public service as well as the life history based
assessment of closeness to the public service and hold constant all relevant control
variables. Results show that even if only focusing on non-professionals, the effect of
ties to the public service remains significant and positive. Next, we exclude left-
wing politicians from the sample in columns (3) and (4). This allows us to analyze
whether ties to the public service also exert an influence on non-left politicians,
which they do to a large and significant extent.20 In specifications (5) to (10) we
19 Note that we do not include Left wing politician as a control in these estimates (similar to
specifications 7 and 8) as the number of seats influences the probability of observing fewer politicians
from the center.
20 Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze a separate sample of left-wing representatives for its sample
size is too small to gain statistically significant results and most of these representatives have ties to the
public services.
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form subsamples using different individual characteristics of representatives: (5)
and (6) focus on politicians younger than 52 years (median age in sample), (7) and
(8) focus on politicians who have attained a university degree (or equivalent), and
(9) and (10) focus on politicians with fewer or equal than three years in parliament
(median time in office). The effect of ties to the public service remains statistically
significant and positive in all three subsamples.21 Finally, we analyze the cultural
dimension of religion and investigate a sample of constituencies where Catholics
form a majority in specifications (11) and (12). Again, the results are similar to
earlier specifications. Thus, according to all our estimates, representatives with ties
to the public service tend to support eligibility of federal public servants with a
higher probability than representatives without such ties.
5 Conclusions
We exploit a referendum on the separation of powers in Switzerland. In 1922, voters
and their representatives in parliament had to decide on the question of whether
federal public servants should be eligible for national parliament. By focusing on
referendum results for different constituencies, we identify constituents’ preferences
with respect to the separation of powers. As representatives voted on the same issue
in parliament, we know their decisions, which can consequently be compared to the
preferences of their constituents. At the same time, we also observe whether
representatives had professional ties to the public service by either analyzing their
profession or using a life history based measure. Local and cantonal public servants
were always eligible and several representatives held a profession as public servants
such as district judges, teachers, communal secretaries, etc. Thus, we can explain
representatives’ behavior in parliament regarding the separation of powers between
the legislature and the administration by focusing on their preexisting profession as
local or cantonal public servants and holding constituents’ preferences constant, all
at the same time.
Our results show that representatives with professional ties to the public service
have a higher probability of voting yes for the eligibility of public servants. Thus, they
tend to favor a reduction in the separation of powers between the administration and
the legislature. Importantly, this result holds true when taking account of constituents’
preferences. Moreover, refinements suggests that if the leeway of politicians to
deviate from their voters increases, ties with the public service play an even greater
role in explaining the support for the eligibility of federal public servants. As the effect
of public servants is independent of constituents’ preferences, it is likely to reflect
personal motivations/ideology of public servants with respect to the separation of
powers. A cautious qualitative analysis of the minutes of the parliamentary session22
21 Forming inverse subsamples, i.e. with older politicians, politicians who have not studied and
politicians who have been to parliament for strictly more than 3 years, does not change the positive effect
of ties to the public service but in some cases with few observations significance at a 10 %-level is not
achieved.
22 Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung 1922, Wa¨hlbarkeit der Bundesbeamten in den Nation-
alrat. Begutachtung des Volksbegehrens.
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indicates that proponents for the eligibility of public servants to parliament were also
partly motivated by the view that public servants dutifully fulfill high quality work and
should thus be eligible.
These findings from a case in 1922 entail potentially important political ramifications
for today and for other countries. In many parliaments around the world, public servants
are eligible and they tend to form a large fraction of parliamentary representatives.
While conflicts of interest of representatives with business relations are often discussed
publically, conflicts of interest of public servants in parliament are usually neglected in
the public debate. Apart from the perception that good parliamentary representation
requires groups from the whole population to be in parliament, a large share of public
servants serving as members of parliament represents a potential violation of the
separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, which depends itself
heavily on the administration. Moreover, our results indicate that public servants
deviate from the constituents’ preferences that they are supposed to represent. In
particular, they deviate from constituents’ preferences when legislative decisions
directly affect them. This is likely to be the case not only for issues regarding the
separation of powers but potentially for other issues involving the administration. Thus,
constraining the eligibility of certain groups of public servants for parliament who are
particularly closely linked to the executive and who actively contribute to shaping law
proposals might prove a valuable policy reform.
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Appendix
See Table 5.
Table 5 Data description and sources
Variable Description and sources Mean SD
MP votes Yes Indicator variable: If member of parliament voted
‘‘yes’’ in roll call value is 1. Amtliches Bulletin der
Bundesversammlung 1922
0.455 0.500
Profession in public service Indicator variable: If member of parliament has a
profession in local or cantonal public service.
Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz
0.400 0.492
Parents were public servants Indicator variable: If parents of member of
parliament were public servants. Historisches
Lexikon der Schweiz
0.179 0.385
Life history based assessment
of closeness to public
service
Indicator variable: If member of parliament has ties
to public service according to life history
(subjective classification). Historisches Lexikon
der Schweiz
0.476 0.501
Constituent yes share Yes share in referendum. Anne´e politique suisse -0.122 0.116
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